A report covering the state of Syrian youth, released by UNICEF in March 2013, notes that due to the effects of the conflict on Syrian youth and education, there will be a ‘lost generation.’ The report states that ‘many schools have been damaged, destroyed or taken over by displaced people seeking shelter. Countless children suffer from the psychological trauma of seeing family members killed, of being separated from their parents and being terrified by the constant thunder of shelling.’

Glenn Owns Bill: A Lesson in Challenging Islamophobia and Taking Responsibility (Video)

The above video is from the 10 May 2013 episode of HBO’s Real Time with Bill Maher. The clip shows an exchange between Bill Maher and Glenn Greenwald following a discussion about the White House and State Department’s immediate response to the 11 September 2012 attack on the US Embassy in Benghazi, Libya. In this clip, Maher claims that theocracy and violence are inherent to Muslims and/or Muslim culture, and that US citizens and policy-makers are void of any responsibility for the status quo of forces in the Middle East (or Muslim world, it is not really clear). Greenwald, in turn, proceeds to give viewers a lesson in how to take down Bill Maher and own up to his responsibility as a US citizen.

Those living in Syria look at things differently. When they are exposed to the terms of debate outside Syria, they smile helplessly, disappointingly, and critically all at once, as though those on both sides of the debate that is happening outside Syria are talking about an imaginary thing, not about realities on the ground. People outside Syria are literally at each other’s throats discursively and physically, arguing over the prioritization of resistance to imperialism or resistance to dictatorship while most local Syrians are wondering about personal security, food, electricity, the safety of their family, and the possibility of dying altogether during the next round of clashes in their neighborhood. Most importantly from an analytical point of view, we erroneously assume that their preferences are stable, but they are not. They too change with circumstances, a perfectly rational behavior.

Thanks to the armed groups who have now perfected—and sometimes surpassed on individual counts—the perennial brutality of the regime, one is hard-pressed in Syria to find a cause or a foreseeable scenario to cling to. Under such conditions, daily matters reign supreme over meta-narratives that are not necessarily unimportant, but have become thoroughly irrelevant for most Syrians. Hence, that smile that many local Syrians draw on their face in the face of meta-narratives spewed by all of us on the other side—to which people click “like,” or not.

This physical detachment, however, does not automatically privilege the analysis of all insiders equitably. Some of the cruder analysis has come from inside Syria. And though such analysis can be discarded as such, it cannot be dismissed as a real expression of real matters, however flawed.

Those of us who have family, friends, and colleagues in Syria with whom we are in touch on a daily basis, and those of us who read Syria news coming out of everywhere and nowhere, know that the discussions inside Syria are far more visceral and real, where positions often reflect immediately consequential action, and where political trade-offs are not academic or theoretical: people die as a result of certain positions. Political trade-offs can mean the difference between being able to provide for one’s family and not being able to put food on the table every night, or not being able to stay in one’s home that same night.

Bassam Haddad in The Triumph and Irrelevance of Meta-Narratives Over Syria: “Rohna Dahiyyah”

Things to remember when discussing Syria.

(via globalwarmist)

[Above image: Fatima Hammdo in a traditional dress and an army uniform, from the Alkarsiffi family album, 1970s.]
“For many years these photographs were hidden. In these bags lay my life’s work and passion, but I often wondered if that really mattered and what I could do with them. After we started working, I felt as if I remembered myself again. I kept this archive safe for many decades. The forgotten lives, friends that died or went away, places and ideas that no longer existed, were brought back. The light was shining on them again.”
—Diab Alkarssifi
Click for more images from The Lebanese Archive of Diab Alkarssifi

[Above image: Fatima Hammdo in a traditional dress and an army uniform, from the Alkarsiffi family album, 1970s.]

“For many years these photographs were hidden. In these bags lay my life’s work and passion, but I often wondered if that really mattered and what I could do with them. After we started working, I felt as if I remembered myself again. I kept this archive safe for many decades. The forgotten lives, friends that died or went away, places and ideas that no longer existed, were brought back. The light was shining on them again.”

Diab Alkarssifi

Click for more images from The Lebanese Archive of Diab Alkarssifi

By far the most common problem among extant treatments of sectarianism and other types of group conflict—whether in the scholarly literature or in popular discussion—is the appeal to description or narration rather than explanation. Thus Iraq, or Bahrain, or Sri Lanka is said to be afflicted by “entrenched hatreds,” “longstanding rivalries,” and other intrinsic and irresolvable conflicts that in turn fuel political instability, social fracture, civil war, and so on. Yet such an explanation is no explanation at all, but rather a simple tautology: sectarianism influences society via “tensions,” “rivalries,” and other ill-defined passions—that is, via sectarianism.

From the Introduction:

From a Western media perspective, coverage of the uprisings has metamorphosed and evolved in intriguing ways. What began as initial alarm at these acts of protestation in the region and the knee-jerk paranoia and condemnation (which leveled accusations of extremism against many dissident movements) eventually turned into favorable cheerleading. In the end, the conduct of Western media is a crescendo of divergent confusion vis-à-vis the particularities in each country’s patterns of public action. Admittedly, the Western media were forced by the uprisings to forgo their reliance on typical motifs because what was happening on the ground was more nuanced than any of the prototypes often depicted and also in response to a strategic shift in Western governments’ tackling of the uprisings.
At first taken by surprise and forced into a state of reactionary caution, Western media quickly adapted their depiction of the uprisings from concern to advocacy for the demands of the dissident movements. The pro-activist representational frames they employed were a unique and welcomed departure from the Orientalist tropes that manufacture Arab dissent as an act of unruly barbaric irrationality. However, they are often prefaced with the latent fear that these revolutionary movements will produce unfavorable “results for Western governments and their interests in the region. For this reason, the international media still have the archetypal repertoires of Arabo- and Islamophobic categories on standby like “first-aid kits” to remedy the anomalously-positive coverage, particularly when these revolutions go awry and no longer seem so fairytale-like. And when it happens, as it has in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya with the rise of Islamist political forces to the forefront, the media can easily revert to tried and tested modalities.

Click to read a longer excerpt from the introduction, including an interview with the editors (and Jadaliyya co-editors) Adel Iskandar and Bassam Haddad.

From the Introduction:

From a Western media perspective, coverage of the uprisings has metamorphosed and evolved in intriguing ways. What began as initial alarm at these acts of protestation in the region and the knee-jerk paranoia and condemnation (which leveled accusations of extremism against many dissident movements) eventually turned into favorable cheerleading. In the end, the conduct of Western media is a crescendo of divergent confusion vis-à-vis the particularities in each country’s patterns of public action. Admittedly, the Western media were forced by the uprisings to forgo their reliance on typical motifs because what was happening on the ground was more nuanced than any of the prototypes often depicted and also in response to a strategic shift in Western governments’ tackling of the uprisings.

At first taken by surprise and forced into a state of reactionary caution, Western media quickly adapted their depiction of the uprisings from concern to advocacy for the demands of the dissident movements. The pro-activist representational frames they employed were a unique and welcomed departure from the Orientalist tropes that manufacture Arab dissent as an act of unruly barbaric irrationality. However, they are often prefaced with the latent fear that these revolutionary movements will produce unfavorable “results for Western governments and their interests in the region. For this reason, the international media still have the archetypal repertoires of Arabo- and Islamophobic categories on standby like “first-aid kits” to remedy the anomalously-positive coverage, particularly when these revolutions go awry and no longer seem so fairytale-like. And when it happens, as it has in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya with the rise of Islamist political forces to the forefront, the media can easily revert to tried and tested modalities.

Click to read a longer excerpt from the introduction, including an interview with the editors (and Jadaliyya co-editors) Adel Iskandar and Bassam Haddad.