Kafranbel Sign Room
The town of Kafranbel in Idlib is renowned for the signs its residents bring to their weekly protests. Written in English and Arabic, Kafranbel’s witty signs have many different messages, from commenting on international hypocrisy regarding Syria, to criticizing the opposition. In the above picture, a resident of Kafranbel stands in a room filled with different posters from their protests.
Click for a Social Media Bouquet from Syria, showcasing various images, audio and video clips making their rounds among Syrian online users.

Kafranbel Sign Room

The town of Kafranbel in Idlib is renowned for the signs its residents bring to their weekly protests. Written in English and Arabic, Kafranbel’s witty signs have many different messages, from commenting on international hypocrisy regarding Syria, to criticizing the opposition. In the above picture, a resident of Kafranbel stands in a room filled with different posters from their protests.

Click for a Social Media Bouquet from Syria, showcasing various images, audio and video clips making their rounds among Syrian online users.

“All in all, the way in which Copts are discussed, both in Egyptian public discourse and in the international media, seems stuck in the nineteenth century, with commentators still relying on the conventional wisdoms of the millet paradigm – according to which Ottoman rulers relied upon clerical leaders to represent the political interests of their respective sects. Under these circumstances, how can one possibly have a meaningful conversation about citizenship – about how the Egyptian revolution might shape conceptions of Egyptian identity?

Despite the hopes that accompanied the January 25 Revolution in this regard, important conversations about citizenship simply are not happening in post-revolutionary Egypt. What makes this all the more remarkable is that, at nearly every previous revolutionary juncture in Egypt’s modern history – 1882, 1919, and 1952 – there was a serious and sustained engagement with the issue of citizenship. Indeed, one might have thought that, not least given its Christian minority, Egypt would have been the Arab uprising context most likely to confront the citizenship question.”

Has Citizenship Got a Future in Egypt?

The region has been dramatically—though unevenly—transformed by the privatization and globalization of national economies under the influence of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and other advocates of neoliberal policies. Though nominally socialist regimes across the region had begun turning away from statist economic polices in the late 1960s, most Arab states did not begin implementing neoliberal reforms in earnest until the 1980s when the fall in global oil prices precipitated a regional economic slump. For states seeking international loans, monies were conditioned upon shifting economic activity toward export-oriented agriculture, manufacturing, and services as well as selling state-owned corporations to private investors—the standard recipe for structural adjustment. Dismantling the institutions of state-driven development necessarily threatened the professed populism of many of these regimes: Raising the standard of living of people long held down by the colonial yoke was understood to be the first priority of the new regimes. But privatization of industry and agriculture, and the shift to service-based economies, combined with reduced price supports on necessities, rendered life increasingly precarious for urban and rural workers as well as the middle class. Such programs often served parallel regime interests by rewarding political allies with privileged access to formerly public assets and new markets. Even for governments that were not pressured into structural adjustment by supranational bodies (like Bahrain and Syria), privatization was often a means of personal enrichment sold as good liberal economics. In some cases, “privatization” was merely a reorganization of ownership such that certain sectors of the regime remained in control

An excerpt from David McMurray and Amanda Ufheil-Somers, editors, The Arab Revolts: Dispatches on Militant Democracy in the Middle East. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013. Published in association with Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP).

Read a longer excerpt here, along with an interview with the editors.

Yousra with her sons. Hani’s father is Jordanian, while Ali’s father is Lebanese. Yousra has been divorced twice. Since Hani, the youngest, has no nationality he cannot go to public school. Lorenzo with his son, Faysal. He is an Italian journalist married to a Lebanese woman. Their two sons can apply for Italian IDs but not Lebanese ones. Samira with her son Faten. Judge John Azzi granted citizenship to her children in 2009, but two days later the government intervened and quashed the decision. The residence permit of one of Samira’s sons. It is valid for three years, but after the age of fifteen it costs about $200 to renew. Moustafa, leader of the independent group “Individual Association of Human Rights.” He is stateless, married and the father of three children, who are therefore also stateless. Randa, Khalet’s mother. She was married to a Syrian man, who died 2 years ago. Her son has a Syrian passport, but has never been there. With the war in Syria they cannot go to renew it.

arabious:

Women Under Siege: Stateless in Lebanon | Linda Dorigo

Lebanon, and its capital Beirut, are often represented by the media as islands of freedom in the Middle East. The well-heeled neighborhoods of Achrafieh and Downtown are reminiscent of a Parisian boutique; while nightlife in Gemmayze and Hamra could compete with the scene in Berlin. But, behind the glossy images of ultra-futuristic skyscrapers and flawless female bodies, Lebanon is a country where women are not allowed to pass citizenship on to their children, or to their non-Lebanese husbands.

The consequence of this lack of legal status is a lack of social rights. The children of a Lebanese woman who is married to a non-Lebanese man are not legally considered Lebanese citizens, even if they were born and raised in Lebanon. They are al-Maktum Qaid, or “stateless.” Being a Palestinian refugee, or a descendant of those who rejected the Lebanese citizenship during the last census in 1932 to avoid military service (when Lebanon was still under French mandate), is another way people acquire the status of al-Maktum Qaid. The stateless do not have passports, do not have access to public health care, cannot attend public schools, and cannot own private property. Marriage and travel also become difficult or impossible. Furthermore, children excluded from nationality rights can be denied residency and deported, thus breaking apart families.

Read more at Jadaliyya.

The Infrastructure of Israeli Settler Colonialism (Part 1): The Jordan Valley

Since its establishment, Israel has distinguished the persons under its civil and military jurisdiction based on religion. Throughout Israel Proper and the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), comprised of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, Israel applies a different set of laws to its Jewish and non-Jewish inhabitants respectively. By bifurcating Jewish nationality from Israeli citizenship, the State is able to afford demonstrable and significant privilege to Jewish persons even beyond Israel’s undeclared borders (hence the reference to Israel Proper) at the expense of the political and socio-economic well-being of its non-Jewish citizens. Within the OPT, the brunt of Israel’s policies are more severe as they are applied under a military occupation regime for which no oversight or legal redress exists. The impact of these policies is to diminish the number of Palestinians, to remove them from their original lands, and to concentrate them geographically. Within the OPT, they are concentrated into Area A; into no-man’s land within the Seam Zone between the Apartheid Wall and the Green Line; and into isolated communities surrounded by Israeli settlements and their associated military apparatus. Within Israel Proper, they are concentrated in urban townships, in unrecognized villages, and other ghettoized communities.  

In this series of videos featuring interviews with Palestinians facing forced displacement, we seek to show a glimpse into Israel’s infrastructure of settler-colonialism. 

We start with Part 1, on the Jordan Valley.

Click here to read more and scroll to the bottom for the second part of the above video.

[Download full-sized version here.]
Not Enough Water in the West Bank?

This Friday is World Water Day and an opportune time to highlight the gross misallocation of water resources between Israel and the Palestinians. Water is one of the five permanent status issues in the Oslo Peace Accords, twenty years old this year. Accordingly, its accesss and consumption is relegated to political negotiations and beyond the purview of international law on water. As a result, the Palestinian Authority has had little basis upon which to challenge Israel’s confiscation of water for the past twenty years. 
Sixty percent of one of Israel’s most significant water sources, the Western Aquifer, is located in the occupied West Bank. Israel derives eighty percent of the Acquifer’s annual yield and Palestinians receive the rest. Prime Ministers Menachim Begin, Ariel Sharon, and Ehud Barak consider control and use of Palestinian water use as a precondition to any Palestinian state. Were it subject to international law, at most Israel would receive only fifty percent of shared water resources.
Failure to abide by these terms of reference has devastated the Palestinian economy. Consider that a little more than one-third of the irrigable land in OPT is actually irrigated, which costs the economy 110,000 jobs per year and ten percent of its annual GDP. 
While the security sector remains robust, the agricultural sector has shrunk from 28.5% of the economy in 1993 to 5.8% today.

Continue reading here

[Download full-sized version here.]

Not Enough Water in the West Bank?

This Friday is World Water Day and an opportune time to highlight the gross misallocation of water resources between Israel and the Palestinians. Water is one of the five permanent status issues in the Oslo Peace Accords, twenty years old this year. Accordingly, its accesss and consumption is relegated to political negotiations and beyond the purview of international law on water. As a result, the Palestinian Authority has had little basis upon which to challenge Israel’s confiscation of water for the past twenty years. 

Sixty percent of one of Israel’s most significant water sources, the Western Aquifer, is located in the occupied West Bank. Israel derives eighty percent of the Acquifer’s annual yield and Palestinians receive the rest. Prime Ministers Menachim Begin, Ariel Sharon, and Ehud Barak consider control and use of Palestinian water use as a precondition to any Palestinian state. Were it subject to international law, at most Israel would receive only fifty percent of shared water resources.

Failure to abide by these terms of reference has devastated the Palestinian economy. Consider that a little more than one-third of the irrigable land in OPT is actually irrigated, which costs the economy 110,000 jobs per year and ten percent of its annual GDP. 

While the security sector remains robust, the agricultural sector has shrunk from 28.5% of the economy in 1993 to 5.8% today.

Continue reading here

The Empire of Sexuality: An Interview with Joseph Massad
أخونة السلفيين
Mainstream Taboo on Criticizing Israel Suffers Visible Cracks (Video)
Almost Two Years of Bloodshed in Syria: What End is There in Sight?
The Sad Potential End of Beheadings in Saudi Arabia
الخوف والغضب: المرأة وعنف ما بعد الثورة
She Who Tells a Story: Interview with the Photography Collective Rawiya
Tunisia and the IMF: A Beggar State and an Impoverished People
جميلة بوحيرد
مجلس التعاون الخليجي وحق العقوبة المقدس

The first order of discussion is to reject certain pretenses that are advanced by various parties to the conflict, along with their supporters. For instance, we cannot take seriously that the Syrian regime is actually looking for a political solution that involves popular will, nor its claim that the raison d’être of the uprising from the start is external. By the same token, we cannot take seriously that the United States is interested in the well being of the Syrian people or democracy in the region. The list of pretenses is quite long, and there is no sense of surveying all of it so long as one proceeds without such patently unwarranted assumptions. For without rejecting such pretenses, no serious discussion about possibilities and potential exits/solutions can ensue. This point might be self-evident, but worth asserting considering the plethora of reports and analyses that proceed from these starting points. They have been going nowhere, and most have been getting Syria wrong, for two years.